07-11-2005, 12:31 AM
சமாதானப் பொறியும், வட அயர்லாந்து தரும் பாடமும்.
கிழே இணைத்திருப்பது The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA
by Kevin. J. Kelley (1988)
என்னும் நூலில் இருந்து சில முக்கியமான பாகங்கள் .
பிருத்தானிய படைகள் வட அயர்லாந்தில் கைக்கொண்ட வெற்றிகரமான உபாயங்களை இவை வெளிக்கொணருகின்றன.
இன்று இந்த சமாதானம் என்று சொல்லப்படுகின்ற காலத்தில் நாம் எதிர் நோக்கும் பல சம்பவங்கள், அமெரிக்க மற்றும் பிருத்தானிய இராணுவ கொள்கைவகுப்பாளரினால் உபாயங்களாக பயிற்றுவிக்கப்படுகின்றன.இவ் இராணுவ உபாயங்கள் எவ்வாறு சிறிலன்கா இராணுவத்தால் நடைமுறைப்படுத்தப்படுகின்றன என்பதையும் ,முடிவில் அவை எவ்வகையான மாற்றத்தை உண்டுபண்ணக் கூடியவை என்பதையும் இது கோடிட்டுக்காட்டுகிறது.
தமிழில் இதை மொழிபெயர்க்கக் கூடியவர்கள் இதை மொழிபெயர்ப்பது பரந்துபட்ட முறையில் இந்த சமாதனப் பொறி பற்றிய புரிதலை அறிய உதவும்.
It should not be imagined that Rees had been duped into allowing the Provos to play these roles, or that the British Government was dismayed by the lRA's policing activities. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that Whitehall and Stormont Castle wanted to encourage exactly these kinds of developments For the British, the most important of all short-term aims in the North was to an end to the fighting. This had now been accomplished, at least temporarilm. a at the relatively modest cost of opening a few incident centres. A cessation attacks on soldiers, police and militiamen was also the primary goal of the second leg in Britain’s Iong-term strategy - ‘normalization’.
This objective, an accompaniment to ‘criminalization’, had been initially cited by Rees in his speech to the Commons in April 1974. In it, the North Ireland Secretary had spoken of the Labour government’s desire to reinstitute ‘normal policing’ in the Six Counties. The British army would soon play a secondary, hack-up role to the R.U.C. , Rees explained. in order to promote more of a ‘law-and-order’ and less of a ‘war time’ atmosphere in the province ‘Normalization’ in this sense thus dovetailed nicely with ‘criminalization’. 0ne prong of the strategy depicted the IRA as a criminal conspiracy, while another sought to convince onlookers that this ‘cops and robbers’ problem was gradual being rectified by the legitimate civil authorities in the province. This whole package was tied neatly together by a third complement in Britain’s master plan for winning the war ‘Ulsterization’, a process that will be discussed later.
The February 1975 truce was a boost for ‘normalization’ as far as the Labour Government was concerned. If an R.U.C. officer could now walk the streets central Belfast or Derry without a powerful and well-grounded fear of being shot then that was surely a long stride toward ‘normal policing’. In addition, the IRA had shown that while it could not be defeated militarily, perhaps it could wooed into curtailing its violence. The incident centres were not too great a price to pay if they eventually led the Provos to become more ‘political’ and less ‘military’. Similarly, allowing the IRA to act as a ghetto police force did n necessarily contradict British plans, and might conceivably prove to be a positive development. It would be particularly beneficial, for example, should the Provos methods of enforcing their version of the law cause frictions in their communities or should some volunteers decide to ‘go straight’ as a result of their new duties Indeed, the Officials taunted the Provos in this regard by referring to the throughout the truce as the ‘R.U.P.’ the Royal Ulster Provos.
The British Government had also agreed to the truce because it was pressing ahead at this time with its Constitutional Convention initiative. Wilson and Rees thought that the loyalist U.U.U.C. politicians might behave somewhat more reasonably in their talks with the S.D.L.P. and Alliance Party without bombs going off in the background. For a more negative reason, Britain entered into a bilateral cease-fire with the IRA out of a desire to squelch ‘troops out’ agitation in the Labour Party rank and file and among a few MPs. It would be much easier to keep the army in the North as long as soldiers were not being shot or blown up, just as it would be to Wilson’s political advantage to prevent further bombings in Britain itself. Finally, and not unimportantly from the British perspective, far more army and police resources could be directed toward intelligence-gathering while the war was in remission. Raids and searches were largely discontinued in response to IRA demands, but surveillance and surreptitious operations were expanded now that the ghettoes were less of a no-go zone. So successful was the British intelligence offensive during the truce that the Provos would later admit they came very close to defeat as a result of police and army penetration of the IRA network.
The incident centres also provided a vehicle for putting Eire Nua into practice, at least in an experimental and localized way. This consideration was certainly central to the overall IRA decision to seek a pause in the war. Most compelling of all the factors, however, was a hint or maybe even a hedged promise, from the British that they would withdraw the army from the North lithe Constitutional Convention failed to produce a political settlement. The Provos say they were told exactly this during their discussions with British officials, but of course they cannot prove it. The Wilson administration denied ever having made such a statement, even indirectly. There are, however, strong indications that something very much like that offer was put on the table by Rees’s representatives during secret talks with the Provos. As William Arlow, one of the go-betweens in IRA-British Government contacts following the Feakle meeting. said in May 1975: 'I have reason to believe that the British government has given a firm commitment to the IRA that they will withdraw the army from Northern Ireland.’
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/truce/kelley88.htm
கிழே இணைத்திருப்பது The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA
by Kevin. J. Kelley (1988)
என்னும் நூலில் இருந்து சில முக்கியமான பாகங்கள் .
பிருத்தானிய படைகள் வட அயர்லாந்தில் கைக்கொண்ட வெற்றிகரமான உபாயங்களை இவை வெளிக்கொணருகின்றன.
இன்று இந்த சமாதானம் என்று சொல்லப்படுகின்ற காலத்தில் நாம் எதிர் நோக்கும் பல சம்பவங்கள், அமெரிக்க மற்றும் பிருத்தானிய இராணுவ கொள்கைவகுப்பாளரினால் உபாயங்களாக பயிற்றுவிக்கப்படுகின்றன.இவ் இராணுவ உபாயங்கள் எவ்வாறு சிறிலன்கா இராணுவத்தால் நடைமுறைப்படுத்தப்படுகின்றன என்பதையும் ,முடிவில் அவை எவ்வகையான மாற்றத்தை உண்டுபண்ணக் கூடியவை என்பதையும் இது கோடிட்டுக்காட்டுகிறது.
தமிழில் இதை மொழிபெயர்க்கக் கூடியவர்கள் இதை மொழிபெயர்ப்பது பரந்துபட்ட முறையில் இந்த சமாதனப் பொறி பற்றிய புரிதலை அறிய உதவும்.
It should not be imagined that Rees had been duped into allowing the Provos to play these roles, or that the British Government was dismayed by the lRA's policing activities. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that Whitehall and Stormont Castle wanted to encourage exactly these kinds of developments For the British, the most important of all short-term aims in the North was to an end to the fighting. This had now been accomplished, at least temporarilm. a at the relatively modest cost of opening a few incident centres. A cessation attacks on soldiers, police and militiamen was also the primary goal of the second leg in Britain’s Iong-term strategy - ‘normalization’.
This objective, an accompaniment to ‘criminalization’, had been initially cited by Rees in his speech to the Commons in April 1974. In it, the North Ireland Secretary had spoken of the Labour government’s desire to reinstitute ‘normal policing’ in the Six Counties. The British army would soon play a secondary, hack-up role to the R.U.C. , Rees explained. in order to promote more of a ‘law-and-order’ and less of a ‘war time’ atmosphere in the province ‘Normalization’ in this sense thus dovetailed nicely with ‘criminalization’. 0ne prong of the strategy depicted the IRA as a criminal conspiracy, while another sought to convince onlookers that this ‘cops and robbers’ problem was gradual being rectified by the legitimate civil authorities in the province. This whole package was tied neatly together by a third complement in Britain’s master plan for winning the war ‘Ulsterization’, a process that will be discussed later.
The February 1975 truce was a boost for ‘normalization’ as far as the Labour Government was concerned. If an R.U.C. officer could now walk the streets central Belfast or Derry without a powerful and well-grounded fear of being shot then that was surely a long stride toward ‘normal policing’. In addition, the IRA had shown that while it could not be defeated militarily, perhaps it could wooed into curtailing its violence. The incident centres were not too great a price to pay if they eventually led the Provos to become more ‘political’ and less ‘military’. Similarly, allowing the IRA to act as a ghetto police force did n necessarily contradict British plans, and might conceivably prove to be a positive development. It would be particularly beneficial, for example, should the Provos methods of enforcing their version of the law cause frictions in their communities or should some volunteers decide to ‘go straight’ as a result of their new duties Indeed, the Officials taunted the Provos in this regard by referring to the throughout the truce as the ‘R.U.P.’ the Royal Ulster Provos.
The British Government had also agreed to the truce because it was pressing ahead at this time with its Constitutional Convention initiative. Wilson and Rees thought that the loyalist U.U.U.C. politicians might behave somewhat more reasonably in their talks with the S.D.L.P. and Alliance Party without bombs going off in the background. For a more negative reason, Britain entered into a bilateral cease-fire with the IRA out of a desire to squelch ‘troops out’ agitation in the Labour Party rank and file and among a few MPs. It would be much easier to keep the army in the North as long as soldiers were not being shot or blown up, just as it would be to Wilson’s political advantage to prevent further bombings in Britain itself. Finally, and not unimportantly from the British perspective, far more army and police resources could be directed toward intelligence-gathering while the war was in remission. Raids and searches were largely discontinued in response to IRA demands, but surveillance and surreptitious operations were expanded now that the ghettoes were less of a no-go zone. So successful was the British intelligence offensive during the truce that the Provos would later admit they came very close to defeat as a result of police and army penetration of the IRA network.
The incident centres also provided a vehicle for putting Eire Nua into practice, at least in an experimental and localized way. This consideration was certainly central to the overall IRA decision to seek a pause in the war. Most compelling of all the factors, however, was a hint or maybe even a hedged promise, from the British that they would withdraw the army from the North lithe Constitutional Convention failed to produce a political settlement. The Provos say they were told exactly this during their discussions with British officials, but of course they cannot prove it. The Wilson administration denied ever having made such a statement, even indirectly. There are, however, strong indications that something very much like that offer was put on the table by Rees’s representatives during secret talks with the Provos. As William Arlow, one of the go-betweens in IRA-British Government contacts following the Feakle meeting. said in May 1975: 'I have reason to believe that the British government has given a firm commitment to the IRA that they will withdraw the army from Northern Ireland.’
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/truce/kelley88.htm


:wink: