07-03-2004, 12:33 AM
Bringing politics to the fore to contain Karuna
By: J. S. Tissainayagam
Source: Northeastern Monthly - July 1, 2004
Though not certain at the time of writing, the visit of Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim to meet the LTTE is not expected to render much positive result. This follows the meeting head of the SLMM General Trond Furhovde had with the chief of the LTTE’s political wing S. P. Thamilchelvan on 28 June, where the Tigers had reiterated their position that meetings between the Sri Lanka army and the LTTE in the Batticaloa-Amparai region would recommence only if the army "gave up Karuna."
At a time when high-level talks have not recommenced after the LTTE withdrew from them in April 2003, meetings at the local level between area commanders are seen as ways of smoothening tensions in trouble spots and implementing the Ceasefire Agreement. Therefore, the withdrawal of the Tigers from these meetings indicates their frame of mind.
Despite LTTE pressure, President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her government are unlikely to sacrifice Karuna now. To them it would appear as bad as withdrawing from Palaly base without a murmur, or handing over an entire squadron of Kfirs to the enemy. The government believes the dearest wish of everyone from local Sinhala nationalists to international ant-terror groups could be accomplished by this individual - that of bifurcating the east and north.
They also believe that with Karuna supporting the government they could appear generous regarding interim administration for the northeast knowing full well three matters: a) if the east is bifurcated from the north due to the Karuna factor the core Tamil demand of a contiguous Tamil homeland encompassing the north and east would evaporate into thin air, <!--emo&B)--><img src='http://www.yarl.com/forum/style_emoticons/default/cool.gif' border='0' valign='absmiddle' alt='cool.gif'><!--endemo--> if indeed an interim administration is given to the LTTE it will only have to be the north, since the east would be separate and c) without the east the LTTE would not be in a position to bargain for the implementation of the ISGA proposals as they are now.
Kumaratunga's statement when speaking to Solheim on 29 June that the government is prepared to take up the matter regarding an interim administration on the basis of the ISGA proposals, before talking on substantive issues, stems from this standpoint. It is not a dramatic gesture of goodwill but a well thought out tactical move.
For his part, Karuna very probably realises that his unrivalled knowledge of the terrain of the northeast as well as weapon systems, troop strengths and the other military assets of the LTTE would be a hindrance to the Tigers to recommence war since the innate secrecy with which the organisation traditionally operated stands exposed.
Second, he also probably realises that the LTTE's presence in the east is not yielding the results expected by that organisation, partly due to its political mishandling of the situation and partly because his popularity as the son of the soil cannot be easily rivalled.
Knowing this Karuna is reportedly registering a political party. It would be the best way to capitalise on the above two factors. He could exploit his popularity among the easterners by saying he is not for war but for a democratic solution to the ethnic problem in the east. This would isolate the LTTE as the only armed guerrilla movement that persists in finding a solution through arms or threat of arms.
At the same time Karuna would, like EPDP leader Douglas Devananda and others, debilitate the LTTE by directing a war of attrition at it. It is usually not realised when Devanada thunders about the LTTE wanting to bump him off that his role as a leader of a political party in parliament is only one of the hats he wears. The other is as part of the government's military apparatus, while enjoying the status and security cover of a political leader. Karuna too no doubt perceives the advantages of this.
The LTTE's way of undermining Karuna's popularity has been to portray his links with the Sri Lanka military, especially its intelligence. This campaign no doubt got its biggest boost when Neelaveni and three other female members who once supported Karuna testified to the close connections he had with the military. It throws up the question even in the most regional-minded easterners: "Did our hero quit the LTTE citing high moral principles only to fall in the hands of our oppressors?"
Though this writer maintains the Jaffna-Batticaloa rivalry largely plagues the minds of the Batticaloa middle-class that populate the halls of academe, the businesses and till lately sections of the media, those who are sensitive to the way people think and feel in the east are critical of the role the Tigers have played in the east in the past decade or so, because they failed to politically conscientise the general public on what the Tamil struggle was about. It was believed the existence of a common enemy - the Sinhala army - was enough of a uniting factor.
But that lasted only as long as the war was on and oppression, abuse and torture were the lot of the eastern Tamil. What has gradually vanished from the political discourse is the question of Tamil nationalism, which among other aspects emphasises an overarching unity that encompasses Tamil-speakers from all over Sri Lanka and indeed the world. It is into this vacuum that sections of the Batticaloa middle-class, especially those active in the university, have been pumping regionalist sentiments. It is feared that unless a concerted effort is made to arrest this trend the more unsavoury sentiments unleashed by the Karuna rebellion might entrench itself in larger and larger groups of Batticaloa society.
The LTTE's refusal to cooperate with the government even on local-level talks automatically brings to bear enormous pressure on the other negotiating party and the facilitators. The pressure could also translate into continuing reluctance on the part of western governments to release aid pledged to the tune US $ 4.5 billion. The LTTE did the same thing in April last year due to the UNF government's move to bring in the international community - especially the US and Japan - into the talks thereby upsetting the balance or parity between the two sides at the negotiating table.
Though harbouring Karuna is the immediate reason for the LTTE to take up such a hard-line position against the government, there are strong international (or regional) currents that are indirectly exerting pressure on the progress of matters concerning war and peace. An influential section of the Tamil lobby seems to believe that with the defence agreement with India due to be signed, the floodgates would be opened of for military support that includes weapons, training and espionage, to flow into this country. They believe an attempt must be made by the Tamils to persuade India to review its ties with the Sri Lanka government, which could only be done by the LTTE giving up some of its political demands.
However, transfer of weaponry, military hardware and training is nothing new to Sri Lanka. India, Pakistan, US, Britain and China are among those who have regularly supplied weapons to this country. They have also trained the local military, shared intelligence, as well as had input in working out strategic and tactical matters. However, whatever the foreign input might be, it is the Sri Lankan soldier who fights. Therefore, though the defence agreement with India might yield a lot in training, equipment and so on, the raw material on deployment remains the same. Therefore, whether matters have hit such a nadir that the LTTE has to give up on its political demands is questionable.
Meanwhile, the UNF has, quietly but consistently held out its willingness to negotiate on the ISGA proposals. Unlike in the case of the UPFA, which vacillates, the UNF has never said it will not negotiate on the basis of the ISGA. The UNF is also the link to the western democracies, which though tolerant of the regime now installed in power in Colombo are not necessarily well disposed towards it - especially the JVP. However, after the drubbing it got in the hands of the Sinhala electorate for being too generous towards the Tamils, the UNF might not be as forthcoming as it was before to negotiate on matters concerning the Tamils. Similarly, the UNF has become the champion of the Buddhist monks in parliament and it is well known the JHU opposes the ISGA.
But for the UNF to become an active part of the picture it has to be in government, not in the opposition. The question is: do the Tamil parties, including the CWC, play politics with the UPFA knowing well that neither short- nor long-term peace can be guaranteed because the main focus of the UPFA is changing the constitution, or to work with the intention of bringing to an end the present regime. This will not only help resolving the ethnic problem but see that some sort of sanity returns to Sri Lanka as a whole.
By: J. S. Tissainayagam
Source: Northeastern Monthly - July 1, 2004
Though not certain at the time of writing, the visit of Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim to meet the LTTE is not expected to render much positive result. This follows the meeting head of the SLMM General Trond Furhovde had with the chief of the LTTE’s political wing S. P. Thamilchelvan on 28 June, where the Tigers had reiterated their position that meetings between the Sri Lanka army and the LTTE in the Batticaloa-Amparai region would recommence only if the army "gave up Karuna."
At a time when high-level talks have not recommenced after the LTTE withdrew from them in April 2003, meetings at the local level between area commanders are seen as ways of smoothening tensions in trouble spots and implementing the Ceasefire Agreement. Therefore, the withdrawal of the Tigers from these meetings indicates their frame of mind.
Despite LTTE pressure, President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her government are unlikely to sacrifice Karuna now. To them it would appear as bad as withdrawing from Palaly base without a murmur, or handing over an entire squadron of Kfirs to the enemy. The government believes the dearest wish of everyone from local Sinhala nationalists to international ant-terror groups could be accomplished by this individual - that of bifurcating the east and north.
They also believe that with Karuna supporting the government they could appear generous regarding interim administration for the northeast knowing full well three matters: a) if the east is bifurcated from the north due to the Karuna factor the core Tamil demand of a contiguous Tamil homeland encompassing the north and east would evaporate into thin air, <!--emo&B)--><img src='http://www.yarl.com/forum/style_emoticons/default/cool.gif' border='0' valign='absmiddle' alt='cool.gif'><!--endemo--> if indeed an interim administration is given to the LTTE it will only have to be the north, since the east would be separate and c) without the east the LTTE would not be in a position to bargain for the implementation of the ISGA proposals as they are now.
Kumaratunga's statement when speaking to Solheim on 29 June that the government is prepared to take up the matter regarding an interim administration on the basis of the ISGA proposals, before talking on substantive issues, stems from this standpoint. It is not a dramatic gesture of goodwill but a well thought out tactical move.
For his part, Karuna very probably realises that his unrivalled knowledge of the terrain of the northeast as well as weapon systems, troop strengths and the other military assets of the LTTE would be a hindrance to the Tigers to recommence war since the innate secrecy with which the organisation traditionally operated stands exposed.
Second, he also probably realises that the LTTE's presence in the east is not yielding the results expected by that organisation, partly due to its political mishandling of the situation and partly because his popularity as the son of the soil cannot be easily rivalled.
Knowing this Karuna is reportedly registering a political party. It would be the best way to capitalise on the above two factors. He could exploit his popularity among the easterners by saying he is not for war but for a democratic solution to the ethnic problem in the east. This would isolate the LTTE as the only armed guerrilla movement that persists in finding a solution through arms or threat of arms.
At the same time Karuna would, like EPDP leader Douglas Devananda and others, debilitate the LTTE by directing a war of attrition at it. It is usually not realised when Devanada thunders about the LTTE wanting to bump him off that his role as a leader of a political party in parliament is only one of the hats he wears. The other is as part of the government's military apparatus, while enjoying the status and security cover of a political leader. Karuna too no doubt perceives the advantages of this.
The LTTE's way of undermining Karuna's popularity has been to portray his links with the Sri Lanka military, especially its intelligence. This campaign no doubt got its biggest boost when Neelaveni and three other female members who once supported Karuna testified to the close connections he had with the military. It throws up the question even in the most regional-minded easterners: "Did our hero quit the LTTE citing high moral principles only to fall in the hands of our oppressors?"
Though this writer maintains the Jaffna-Batticaloa rivalry largely plagues the minds of the Batticaloa middle-class that populate the halls of academe, the businesses and till lately sections of the media, those who are sensitive to the way people think and feel in the east are critical of the role the Tigers have played in the east in the past decade or so, because they failed to politically conscientise the general public on what the Tamil struggle was about. It was believed the existence of a common enemy - the Sinhala army - was enough of a uniting factor.
But that lasted only as long as the war was on and oppression, abuse and torture were the lot of the eastern Tamil. What has gradually vanished from the political discourse is the question of Tamil nationalism, which among other aspects emphasises an overarching unity that encompasses Tamil-speakers from all over Sri Lanka and indeed the world. It is into this vacuum that sections of the Batticaloa middle-class, especially those active in the university, have been pumping regionalist sentiments. It is feared that unless a concerted effort is made to arrest this trend the more unsavoury sentiments unleashed by the Karuna rebellion might entrench itself in larger and larger groups of Batticaloa society.
The LTTE's refusal to cooperate with the government even on local-level talks automatically brings to bear enormous pressure on the other negotiating party and the facilitators. The pressure could also translate into continuing reluctance on the part of western governments to release aid pledged to the tune US $ 4.5 billion. The LTTE did the same thing in April last year due to the UNF government's move to bring in the international community - especially the US and Japan - into the talks thereby upsetting the balance or parity between the two sides at the negotiating table.
Though harbouring Karuna is the immediate reason for the LTTE to take up such a hard-line position against the government, there are strong international (or regional) currents that are indirectly exerting pressure on the progress of matters concerning war and peace. An influential section of the Tamil lobby seems to believe that with the defence agreement with India due to be signed, the floodgates would be opened of for military support that includes weapons, training and espionage, to flow into this country. They believe an attempt must be made by the Tamils to persuade India to review its ties with the Sri Lanka government, which could only be done by the LTTE giving up some of its political demands.
However, transfer of weaponry, military hardware and training is nothing new to Sri Lanka. India, Pakistan, US, Britain and China are among those who have regularly supplied weapons to this country. They have also trained the local military, shared intelligence, as well as had input in working out strategic and tactical matters. However, whatever the foreign input might be, it is the Sri Lankan soldier who fights. Therefore, though the defence agreement with India might yield a lot in training, equipment and so on, the raw material on deployment remains the same. Therefore, whether matters have hit such a nadir that the LTTE has to give up on its political demands is questionable.
Meanwhile, the UNF has, quietly but consistently held out its willingness to negotiate on the ISGA proposals. Unlike in the case of the UPFA, which vacillates, the UNF has never said it will not negotiate on the basis of the ISGA. The UNF is also the link to the western democracies, which though tolerant of the regime now installed in power in Colombo are not necessarily well disposed towards it - especially the JVP. However, after the drubbing it got in the hands of the Sinhala electorate for being too generous towards the Tamils, the UNF might not be as forthcoming as it was before to negotiate on matters concerning the Tamils. Similarly, the UNF has become the champion of the Buddhist monks in parliament and it is well known the JHU opposes the ISGA.
But for the UNF to become an active part of the picture it has to be in government, not in the opposition. The question is: do the Tamil parties, including the CWC, play politics with the UPFA knowing well that neither short- nor long-term peace can be guaranteed because the main focus of the UPFA is changing the constitution, or to work with the intention of bringing to an end the present regime. This will not only help resolving the ethnic problem but see that some sort of sanity returns to Sri Lanka as a whole.
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