04-16-2004, 05:12 PM
How the LTTE neutralised Karuna
By V.S. Sambandan
COLOMBO, APRIL 16. A mix of psychological operations, planned military manoeuvres, elimination of political rivals and the timing of the launch of the offensive were instrumental in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) wresting control from the rebel military commander, V. Muralitharan (`Col.' Karuna) in eastern Sri Lanka.
According to sources in eastern Sri Lanka, some key moves that brought a swift end to the LTTE's Good Friday offensive against Karuna were made before the formal launch of the attack on April 9.
The killing of a pro-Karuna contestant in the parliamentary elections, Rajan Sathiyamoorthy, and the attacks on the Batticaloa Government Agent, Mounaguruswamy, and an academic of the eastern University, Tiruchelvam, in March are seen as pre-emptive strikes against Karuna's supporters.
Sathiyamoorthy's killing, the sources say, was one that effectively choked a crucial political option for Karuna. ``Sathiyamoorthy was his staunch supporter and he would have been able to espouse Karuna's case to the outside world,'' a Batticaloa resident said.
``Similarly, after Prof. Tiruchelvam and Mr. Mounaguruswamy were attacked, the support for Karuna was severely dented.''
If Sathiyamoorthy's killing cut the political base of Karuna, at the military level, the cadres who launched the offensive were ``eastern fighters, not the northern cadres,'' the sources said.
``As soon as the first offensive was launched, there was pressure from the parents on Karuna to release his cadres.
Their rallying point was `we did not send out fighters to wage a war against our own people','' the sources said.
Moreover, most of Karuna's fighters, according to the sources ``were recruited after the ceasefire agreement and not all of them had battle-experience.''
The decision by the LTTE to deploy the `Jayanthan Brigade' that was instrumental in the Elephant Pass victory of April 2000 against the Sri Lanka Army is said to be another move that turned the tide against Karuna.
According to a columnist in The Daily Mirror, the LTTE sent its newly raised Special Forces, a surprise element in the four-day offensive.
The sources in the east said the major difference was brought about by ``small groups of infiltrators,'' who went in as civilians.
``They spoke their same rebel language and in key places, these small groups were effective as Karuna's cadres either just left their bases or joined the LTTE's forces.''
The timing of the offensive just after the April 2 parliamentary elections and before the new government faces Parliament on April 22 is seen as another factor that effectively neutralised the political focus on the LTTE's internal battle.
The exact whereabouts of Karuna remain unknown and the LTTE is reportedly continuing the search for its former special commander for Batticaloa and Amparai who was till his expulsion on March 6, the longest serving regional commander.
Thanx: The Hindu
By V.S. Sambandan
COLOMBO, APRIL 16. A mix of psychological operations, planned military manoeuvres, elimination of political rivals and the timing of the launch of the offensive were instrumental in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) wresting control from the rebel military commander, V. Muralitharan (`Col.' Karuna) in eastern Sri Lanka.
According to sources in eastern Sri Lanka, some key moves that brought a swift end to the LTTE's Good Friday offensive against Karuna were made before the formal launch of the attack on April 9.
The killing of a pro-Karuna contestant in the parliamentary elections, Rajan Sathiyamoorthy, and the attacks on the Batticaloa Government Agent, Mounaguruswamy, and an academic of the eastern University, Tiruchelvam, in March are seen as pre-emptive strikes against Karuna's supporters.
Sathiyamoorthy's killing, the sources say, was one that effectively choked a crucial political option for Karuna. ``Sathiyamoorthy was his staunch supporter and he would have been able to espouse Karuna's case to the outside world,'' a Batticaloa resident said.
``Similarly, after Prof. Tiruchelvam and Mr. Mounaguruswamy were attacked, the support for Karuna was severely dented.''
If Sathiyamoorthy's killing cut the political base of Karuna, at the military level, the cadres who launched the offensive were ``eastern fighters, not the northern cadres,'' the sources said.
``As soon as the first offensive was launched, there was pressure from the parents on Karuna to release his cadres.
Their rallying point was `we did not send out fighters to wage a war against our own people','' the sources said.
Moreover, most of Karuna's fighters, according to the sources ``were recruited after the ceasefire agreement and not all of them had battle-experience.''
The decision by the LTTE to deploy the `Jayanthan Brigade' that was instrumental in the Elephant Pass victory of April 2000 against the Sri Lanka Army is said to be another move that turned the tide against Karuna.
According to a columnist in The Daily Mirror, the LTTE sent its newly raised Special Forces, a surprise element in the four-day offensive.
The sources in the east said the major difference was brought about by ``small groups of infiltrators,'' who went in as civilians.
``They spoke their same rebel language and in key places, these small groups were effective as Karuna's cadres either just left their bases or joined the LTTE's forces.''
The timing of the offensive just after the April 2 parliamentary elections and before the new government faces Parliament on April 22 is seen as another factor that effectively neutralised the political focus on the LTTE's internal battle.
The exact whereabouts of Karuna remain unknown and the LTTE is reportedly continuing the search for its former special commander for Batticaloa and Amparai who was till his expulsion on March 6, the longest serving regional commander.
Thanx: The Hindu
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