03-09-2004, 09:50 AM
<b>Beware when Tigers fall out </b>
BANGALORE - Another complicating dimension has been added to Sri Lanka's beleaguered peace process following a formal split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While the division is expected to weaken the LTTE's military capacity, it could lead to the organization hardening its position at the negotiating table.
On Saturday, the LTTE "discharged" its eastern military commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (aka "Colonel" Karuna), accusing him of "acting traitorously to the Tamil people and the Tamil Eelam national leadership" "at the instigation of malicious elements". Karuna's discharge came a couple of days after reports from the island's Eastern Province indicated that simmering differences between Karuna and LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabakaran had exploded into a nasty rift.
Karuna, who has been with the LTTE for two decades, is the only regional commander in the LTTE to hold the position for 17 years. Until recently, he was in charge of the LTTE's Batticaloa-Amparai area. A hardliner, he is known for his military prowess and ruthlessness, and is credited with chalking out the strategy for several Tiger operations against the Sri Lankan armed forces over the years. He was part of the LTTE negotiating team at last year's peace talks with the Sri Lankan government.
Karuna hails from the eastern district of Batticaloa and has battled to further the interests of Tiger cadres from the Eastern Province in the Northern Province-dominated LTTE. His revolt against the LTTE leadership is not surprising as it has its roots in long-festering grievances against the northern Tamil leadership.
It appears that Karuna's revolt was triggered by a demand from northern leaders, based in Wanni, that he send 1,000 of his combat troops to Wanni. Karuna is said to have turned down the request on the grounds that the redeployment would weaken the LTTE in the Eastern Province.
In a letter addressed to Prabakaran on March 2, Karuna, while describing Prabakaran as a "god" for Batticaloa-Amparai cadres, demanded complete autonomy for the Batticalao-Amparai district within the LTTE administration.
Prabakaran's response was swift. He discharged Karuna and replaced him with Ramesh, the special commander for the Batticaloa-Amparai district and a Prabakaran loyalist.
While admitting the crisis in the organization, the LTTE described it as a temporary one. Tamilchelvam, the leader of the LTTE's political wing, dismissed the split as "a problem concerning a single leader". But it is much more.
Unlike the overwhelmingly Tamil Northern Province, the Eastern Province is an explosive mixture of Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims. The eastern districts have seen some of the worst bloodshed since the start of the armed conflict two decades ago. For years, Karuna and the LTTE's eastern wing have nursed the grievance that while it is the eastern cadres that do most of the fighting - most of this fighting has been to defend LTTE positions in the north - and dying, it is Tigers from the north who occupy the top decision-making posts in the organization. Around 60 percent of the LTTE's "martyrs" are from its eastern wing; most of them were killed fighting in the north.
Of the LTTE's 32 departments or divisions, only one was headed by an easterner - Karuna. It is said that eastern Tigers have always resented the fact that all important decisions were made by the northern Tigers, even on those issues that were of central concern to the east - such as relations with Muslims, for instance.
Karuna's breaking away from the LTTE has dealt a big blow to the LTTE's monolithic image. While this is not the first time that the LTTE has faced dissension, the implications of the current rift are far-reaching. Few have dared to defy Prabakaran. Those who have differed with him simply quit the organization or were killed. Any seeming challenge to Prabakaran's leadership has been swiftly crushed. Rifts within the LTTE have never resulted in a chunk of the organization breaking away. That has become a real possibility today.
Some analysts believe that the current crisis is likely to split the LTTE along regional lines, with the eastern wing rallying behind Karuna. Karuna controls a third of the LTTE's approximately 18,000 strong cadre. He is said to have considerable support in the east and is seen as someone who has raised issues of concern to eastern Tamils. There have been large demonstrations in Batticaloa town protesting his dismissal. For the first time, Tamils in Batticaloa burnt effigies of Prabakaran and his intelligence chief, Pottu Amman.
However, there are early signals that things might not work in Karuna's favor. Most of his leaders have deserted him and thrown in their lot with Prabakaran. Funds remain under the control of the northern leadership. Karuna is up against the LTTE's formidable intelligence wing, which again remains under the control of the northern leadership.
While the Sri Lankan government has refrained from taking sides in the feud, it has turned down Karuna's request for a separate ceasefire agreement with him. And the army has refused to stop Prabakaran loyalists based in the east from fleeing to the north with their families. Nor has it allowed his supporters based in the north to return to the safety of the east. As the Hindustan Times' Colombo correspondent P K Balachanddran points out: "The armed forces have thus sided with Prabakaran."
Karuna might have built up a political-administrative structure in the east that is almost on par with that in the north. And while he is a leader of considerable standing, he is no match for Prabakaran. The LTTE cadres, indeed many Tamils in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora, look up to Prabakaran, who enjoys demi-god status among the Tigers and Tamils. They are unlikely to shift loyalties to Karuna.
A section in Sri Lanka seems to believe that the split in the LTTE is a positive development for the peace process. According to them, a divided LTTE will be weaker and hence less intransigent at the talks table. For instance, the Daily Mirror's Keith Noyahr points out that the "current rift, unprecedented in the regimented control of the LTTE, like an act of providence, could force the Tigers to be more flexible at future negotiations on the ISGA [Interim Self Governing Authority] as well as a final solution."
Another argument is that if the LTTE were to split along regional lines, it would weaken the Tamil demand for the merger of the two provinces. Karuna has spoken to the Associated Press about "full self-administration" in the east in the future. This raises the possibility of the demerger of the north and east - something that the LTTE has traditionally opposed, but Sinhalese and Muslims living here would support as it would make them less of a minority.
The split in the LTTE will no doubt weaken its military capacity in the short run. Karuna's exit is a loss to the LTTE. And if the LTTE cannot isolate Karuna quickly, it is likely that the two sides will seek to eliminate each others' fighters, and the coming weeks could see much bloodletting. Karuna has already complained that death squads are hunting him down.
The likely fratricidal fighting could draw the Lankan armed forces into the conflict, and that in turn could result in the ceasefire agreement unraveling.
The current crisis can be expected to push Prabakaran into adopting a more hardline position if and when the suspended talks are resumed. Karuna is even less compromising than Prabakaran, especially on the eastern question. Previous attempts at a political solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict have usually crumbled over the eastern question. And Karuna's unwillingness to compromise is believed to have been behind the LTTE intransigence.
Karuna is said to be opposed to the present peace process too. It is believed that Prabakaran included him in the LTTE negotiating team not only because of the significance of the eastern question, but also to prevent him from subverting the talks.
In an opinion piece in the Sunday Leader, D B S Jeyraj points out that "the first discordant note" in the present peace process "was struck by Karuna. After functioning briefly as co-chair of the sub-committee overseeing de-escalation of military activity, the frank Karuna discovered that the committee was simply not moving because the armed forces were not budging from the high security zones.
"Karuna walked out of an 'aimless' meeting and announced publicly that he will not be participating in the sub-committee any more as it was pointless. He reiterated his stance at subsequent rounds of talks and the sub-committee became defunct. This was more or less a harbinger of subsequent events."
Karuna outside the LTTE is likely to criticize the peace process even more. He can be expected to project any concession by the LTTE, especially on issues of significance to the east, as a sellout and a betrayal of Tamil interests.
The impact of Karuna's exit from the peace process will depend on how quickly Prabakaran is able to isolate or eliminate him. The fate of previous Tiger dissidents shows that Karuna's chances of surviving Prabakaran's wrath are near negligible. (The Tigers have already likened Karuna to Cambodia's Pol Pot, who caused the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people in his country's "Killing Fields".)
Infighting within the Colombo government severely undermined the outlook for the peace process. The biggest revolt ever within the LTTE has now further jeopardized the already ailing peace process.
Thanx: Asia Times
BANGALORE - Another complicating dimension has been added to Sri Lanka's beleaguered peace process following a formal split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). While the division is expected to weaken the LTTE's military capacity, it could lead to the organization hardening its position at the negotiating table.
On Saturday, the LTTE "discharged" its eastern military commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (aka "Colonel" Karuna), accusing him of "acting traitorously to the Tamil people and the Tamil Eelam national leadership" "at the instigation of malicious elements". Karuna's discharge came a couple of days after reports from the island's Eastern Province indicated that simmering differences between Karuna and LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabakaran had exploded into a nasty rift.
Karuna, who has been with the LTTE for two decades, is the only regional commander in the LTTE to hold the position for 17 years. Until recently, he was in charge of the LTTE's Batticaloa-Amparai area. A hardliner, he is known for his military prowess and ruthlessness, and is credited with chalking out the strategy for several Tiger operations against the Sri Lankan armed forces over the years. He was part of the LTTE negotiating team at last year's peace talks with the Sri Lankan government.
Karuna hails from the eastern district of Batticaloa and has battled to further the interests of Tiger cadres from the Eastern Province in the Northern Province-dominated LTTE. His revolt against the LTTE leadership is not surprising as it has its roots in long-festering grievances against the northern Tamil leadership.
It appears that Karuna's revolt was triggered by a demand from northern leaders, based in Wanni, that he send 1,000 of his combat troops to Wanni. Karuna is said to have turned down the request on the grounds that the redeployment would weaken the LTTE in the Eastern Province.
In a letter addressed to Prabakaran on March 2, Karuna, while describing Prabakaran as a "god" for Batticaloa-Amparai cadres, demanded complete autonomy for the Batticalao-Amparai district within the LTTE administration.
Prabakaran's response was swift. He discharged Karuna and replaced him with Ramesh, the special commander for the Batticaloa-Amparai district and a Prabakaran loyalist.
While admitting the crisis in the organization, the LTTE described it as a temporary one. Tamilchelvam, the leader of the LTTE's political wing, dismissed the split as "a problem concerning a single leader". But it is much more.
Unlike the overwhelmingly Tamil Northern Province, the Eastern Province is an explosive mixture of Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims. The eastern districts have seen some of the worst bloodshed since the start of the armed conflict two decades ago. For years, Karuna and the LTTE's eastern wing have nursed the grievance that while it is the eastern cadres that do most of the fighting - most of this fighting has been to defend LTTE positions in the north - and dying, it is Tigers from the north who occupy the top decision-making posts in the organization. Around 60 percent of the LTTE's "martyrs" are from its eastern wing; most of them were killed fighting in the north.
Of the LTTE's 32 departments or divisions, only one was headed by an easterner - Karuna. It is said that eastern Tigers have always resented the fact that all important decisions were made by the northern Tigers, even on those issues that were of central concern to the east - such as relations with Muslims, for instance.
Karuna's breaking away from the LTTE has dealt a big blow to the LTTE's monolithic image. While this is not the first time that the LTTE has faced dissension, the implications of the current rift are far-reaching. Few have dared to defy Prabakaran. Those who have differed with him simply quit the organization or were killed. Any seeming challenge to Prabakaran's leadership has been swiftly crushed. Rifts within the LTTE have never resulted in a chunk of the organization breaking away. That has become a real possibility today.
Some analysts believe that the current crisis is likely to split the LTTE along regional lines, with the eastern wing rallying behind Karuna. Karuna controls a third of the LTTE's approximately 18,000 strong cadre. He is said to have considerable support in the east and is seen as someone who has raised issues of concern to eastern Tamils. There have been large demonstrations in Batticaloa town protesting his dismissal. For the first time, Tamils in Batticaloa burnt effigies of Prabakaran and his intelligence chief, Pottu Amman.
However, there are early signals that things might not work in Karuna's favor. Most of his leaders have deserted him and thrown in their lot with Prabakaran. Funds remain under the control of the northern leadership. Karuna is up against the LTTE's formidable intelligence wing, which again remains under the control of the northern leadership.
While the Sri Lankan government has refrained from taking sides in the feud, it has turned down Karuna's request for a separate ceasefire agreement with him. And the army has refused to stop Prabakaran loyalists based in the east from fleeing to the north with their families. Nor has it allowed his supporters based in the north to return to the safety of the east. As the Hindustan Times' Colombo correspondent P K Balachanddran points out: "The armed forces have thus sided with Prabakaran."
Karuna might have built up a political-administrative structure in the east that is almost on par with that in the north. And while he is a leader of considerable standing, he is no match for Prabakaran. The LTTE cadres, indeed many Tamils in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora, look up to Prabakaran, who enjoys demi-god status among the Tigers and Tamils. They are unlikely to shift loyalties to Karuna.
A section in Sri Lanka seems to believe that the split in the LTTE is a positive development for the peace process. According to them, a divided LTTE will be weaker and hence less intransigent at the talks table. For instance, the Daily Mirror's Keith Noyahr points out that the "current rift, unprecedented in the regimented control of the LTTE, like an act of providence, could force the Tigers to be more flexible at future negotiations on the ISGA [Interim Self Governing Authority] as well as a final solution."
Another argument is that if the LTTE were to split along regional lines, it would weaken the Tamil demand for the merger of the two provinces. Karuna has spoken to the Associated Press about "full self-administration" in the east in the future. This raises the possibility of the demerger of the north and east - something that the LTTE has traditionally opposed, but Sinhalese and Muslims living here would support as it would make them less of a minority.
The split in the LTTE will no doubt weaken its military capacity in the short run. Karuna's exit is a loss to the LTTE. And if the LTTE cannot isolate Karuna quickly, it is likely that the two sides will seek to eliminate each others' fighters, and the coming weeks could see much bloodletting. Karuna has already complained that death squads are hunting him down.
The likely fratricidal fighting could draw the Lankan armed forces into the conflict, and that in turn could result in the ceasefire agreement unraveling.
The current crisis can be expected to push Prabakaran into adopting a more hardline position if and when the suspended talks are resumed. Karuna is even less compromising than Prabakaran, especially on the eastern question. Previous attempts at a political solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict have usually crumbled over the eastern question. And Karuna's unwillingness to compromise is believed to have been behind the LTTE intransigence.
Karuna is said to be opposed to the present peace process too. It is believed that Prabakaran included him in the LTTE negotiating team not only because of the significance of the eastern question, but also to prevent him from subverting the talks.
In an opinion piece in the Sunday Leader, D B S Jeyraj points out that "the first discordant note" in the present peace process "was struck by Karuna. After functioning briefly as co-chair of the sub-committee overseeing de-escalation of military activity, the frank Karuna discovered that the committee was simply not moving because the armed forces were not budging from the high security zones.
"Karuna walked out of an 'aimless' meeting and announced publicly that he will not be participating in the sub-committee any more as it was pointless. He reiterated his stance at subsequent rounds of talks and the sub-committee became defunct. This was more or less a harbinger of subsequent events."
Karuna outside the LTTE is likely to criticize the peace process even more. He can be expected to project any concession by the LTTE, especially on issues of significance to the east, as a sellout and a betrayal of Tamil interests.
The impact of Karuna's exit from the peace process will depend on how quickly Prabakaran is able to isolate or eliminate him. The fate of previous Tiger dissidents shows that Karuna's chances of surviving Prabakaran's wrath are near negligible. (The Tigers have already likened Karuna to Cambodia's Pol Pot, who caused the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million people in his country's "Killing Fields".)
Infighting within the Colombo government severely undermined the outlook for the peace process. The biggest revolt ever within the LTTE has now further jeopardized the already ailing peace process.
Thanx: Asia Times
<span style='font-size:20pt;line-height:100%'>Success is not the key to happiness. Happiness is the key to success. If you love what you are doing, you will be successful.</span>

