11-22-2005, 06:15 PM
ஒரு சிங்களவரின் பார்வையில் மகிந்தரின் நிலை
The new government and the ethnic problem
By K. Godage
Has the LTTE pulled off another victory? Would their
so-called ?victory? turnout to be a pyrrhic one?
In an article published after the now President
Mahinda Rajapakse concluded agreements with the JVP
and the JHU I referred to the long planned strategy
of the LTTE and quoted Balasingham who had said, ?Our
best allies are the JVP and the JHU?---The perceptive
Balasingham could not have said a truer word for they
wanted to ensure a polarization of forces which they
could not achieve with a Ranil Wickremasinghe
administration. The LTTE?s strategy all along was to
ensure, rather than Ranil, that Mahinda became
President (the TNA was informed of this some months
ago). Ranil to them has been a formidable proposition
for he had not only a structured approach to the
peace process but had also been able to mobilize the
international community.
Even more importantly he had obtained a commitment
from the international community to hold the LTTE to
the matter of ?exploring a federal solution within a
united Sri Lanka,? which the LTTE seems determined to
avoid for their goal remains a separate state. This
was the one and only reason why they prevented the
Tamil people from voting for Ranil. This tactic has
ensured the polarization they sought and would help
them to make the charge that the Sinhalese would not
concede anything to the Tamil people and that their
struggle for a separate state is justified.
This is indeed the challenge that faces the new
President; to prove to the Tamil people and the
international community that though he may have been
elected through a Sinhalese Buddhist vote he is
committed to a fair and just settlement of the ethnic
problem. He has indeed the capacity and the ability
to do so for as his career indicates, he has indeed
achieved whatever he sought to achieve despite the
odds.
It has been reported that a LTTE document circulated
amongst the Tamil Diaspora in Europe states that a
Mahinda victory would be entirely satisfactory to
further their march towards the realization of Eelam.
Their position simply stated is that Mahinda is a
prisoner of the JVP and the JHU and would not be able
to concede anything to the Tamil people; (Statements
made by JVP and JHU leaders have been appended to the
document) and that the LTTE could strengthen its
position on the ground in the peninsula in the near
future and then declare UDI and explain to the
international community that they were compelled to
take this course of action in the light of a hard line
Sinhala racist government coming into Colombo which
left them without any hope.
The diaspora is requested to prepare their lobbyists
to make the point that the LTTE was compelled to take
this course of action in the light of the above
mentioned situation and the continued intransigence
of the governments in the South, who have consistently
refused to concede the rights of the Tamil people
over the past 50 years.
The document, it is said, states that Mahinda is
wholly ignorant of Tamil aspirations and that he nor
his supporters understand the fundamentals of the
problem and their perspective on the issue of Tamil
rights is wholly at variance with reality (there is an
element of truth in this for Minister Premjayant
recently referred to the Tamils as a ?Minority?, they
claim they are a Nation and not a national minority).
The document refers to the fact that unlike Ranil
Wickremesinghe, Mahinda has no experience in dealing
with the international community and describes him as
a novice and that he would not be able to mobilize
international support as Wickremesinghe did and that
this augurs well for them. A reference is made to the
fact that the 'absence' of Lakshman Kadirgamar leaves
the door open for the Diaspora to campaign
effectively.
It appears doubtful as to whether the new government
already has a plan, which they intend to put before
the LTTE and the people. It has been reported that
they had been interested in the Aceh Agreement
brokered by the Fins but that Agreement gives the
Indonesian province of Aceh a measure of autonomy
somewhat similar to the ISGA.
At other times it has been said that they seek a
solution based on the Indian model, which
incidentally involves a sharing of power with the
constituent states. It was indeed the Indian model
that was written into the 13th Amendment; the problem
there was that the Concurrent list in the 13th
Amendment in a sense nullified the devolution. If the
new government wishes to obtain India?s support they
would then need to move forward from the 13th
Amendment; that has to be the road map. In this
regard they would do well to study the Mangala
Moonesinghe report and use that and the 13th
Amendment as a starting point.
Is the JVP and JHU aware that with the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution initiated by India in
the form of Annexure C and enshrined in the
Indo-Lanka Accord, we have commenced an irreversible
process of devolution of power. The so-called
?sanctity? attached to the concept identified as
?Unitary? has, for better or for worse, long been
eroded. Whether we like it or not there are indeed
more federal states including India than unitary
states in the world today.
President Rajapakse would now have to put his
election rhetoric behind him and face reality. Though
they in their Manifesto stated that they would
re-negotiate the CFA and the P-TOMS they must now face
reality and accept that these Agreements cannot be
re-negotiated. Yes the CFA was no ?agreement? it was
an imposition but what makes the parties to the
Manifesto think that they can accomplish the
following; ?the said Agreement (the CFA) shall be
revived and revised fully and the said agreement
shall be redone removing and eliminating all the
clauses that are prejudicial and harmful to national
security??.? What would be the strategy of the
government for doing this? Is it the belief of the
JVP and the JHU that our Armed services could get the
LTTE to yield? That certainly is a laugh. The LTTE
would never agree, what then would or could the new
government do? Go to war? The immense power of the
LTTE over the Tamil people was amply demonstrated when
they intimidated them and they refrained from
participating in the Presidential election; they are
not to be underestimated. The CFA can certainly be
improved upon but then who would bell the cat?
The new government has also created another problem
for themselves by wanting the Norwegians out. I
cannot think of any country that would want to take
on this thankless task, certainly it would not be
India which has proscribed the LTTE and would not
hence be able to have any dealings with them. Yes the
Norwegians have not been honest brokers but where can
you find a replacement for them? As stated earlier,
India cannot and will not get involved in any
exercise that would be frowned upon by the political
parties in Tamil Nadu, we have to live with that
fact. As for the UN, the matter of a meaningful
involvement would have to be endorsed by the Security
Council on the basis that there is a threat to
international peace and security, short of that the SG
could nominate, as he has done, a representative to
make an assessment of the situation.
The ideal situation would be if the SG is able to
obtain the sanction of the SC to appoint a person of
the caliber of Richard Holbrook (to do what he did in
Bosnia with the support of the US) or Richard
Armitage also with the support of the US government to
intercede and undertake a ?John Mitchell? type
operation but it is absolutely unlikely that any
government of Mr. Rajapakse would have the capacity
to work with the international community to pull off a
thing like that.
The problem here is that those who forged the
Manifesto did not have the benefit of being briefed
on the peace process by any knowledgeable person. In
keeping with his stated intention to make the process
inclusive, President Rajapakse and his team should
invite Prof. GL Peiris and Milinda Moragoda who were
associated in talks with the LTTE and Jayantha
Dhanapala to brief them. It is in the country?s
interest that the new government be fully briefed on
the situation. They would also need to be briefed by
the Service Chiefs, the DFI and the DII on the
internal and external dimensions of the issue. They
cannot come to decisions without all the facts and on
the basis of prejudice --- too much is at stake and
they cannot be allowed to make stupid mistakes that
would result in others paying with their lives.
If the new government takes a hard line and tries to
implement their election rhetoric they would not only
be playing right into the hands of the LTTE but would
lead this country into a huge disaster.
A few other matters need to be referred to; Clause 2
of the Agreement between the JVP and President
Rajapakse stated that they would hold negotiations
?not only with the LTTE but also with all other
relevant parties??..? . In principle this is certainly
correct but the LTTE will never sit at the same table
with the others. We cannot also ignore the fact that
it is they who control territory and is the principal
enemy not the others. The only way to involve ?all
other relevant parties ? is to have separate parallel
discussions with them but the LTTE may not come to
the negotiating table if the government also has
parallel negotiations with the other groups. What then
can the government of President Rajapakse then do?
A person sorely missed today is Lakshman Kadirgamar.
Had he been alive he would have explained to them
that their positions are unrealistic. The government
must be briefed on the importance of the
international community in this conflict and the role
that it has played. The Marxist JVP must be briefed
on the international situation today by the able
Foreign Secretary G.S. Pallihakkara and his team.
They must in particular understand why it is
absolutely necessary for this country to have the
closest of relations with the US and Europe and the
total dependence of the garment industry on the US and
the EU and that hundreds of thousands of jobs are at
stake if we cross them. In this regard the new
government should understand that China is our
principal competitor when it comes to the export of
garments. Whilst we should cultivate the closest of
relations with the countries of Asia we should not
forget that the markets for our products are in the
west, neither should we forget that investment and
technology comes essentially from the west as do our
tourists.
In conclusion I wish to remind the new government
that in the period after the ceasefire ?the period of
relative peace resulted in the break-up of the LTTE,
and the LTTE would no doubt be having problems with
keeping their battle-trained cadres in tact; nothing
would help the LTTE to mobilize, motivate and
reinvigorate their cadres than a hard line position
by Sinhala hard-liners in the south.
We are indeed giving the LTTE the excuse they are
waiting nay yearning for. In any event the
international community is tired of what they
perceive to be Sinhala intransigence and would rather
help the LTTE to achieve Eelam unless we move quickly
to address the grievances of the Tamil people and
ensure that they too live as equal citizens with
dignity and in security and be able to decide on their
own destiny to the furthest possible extent
compatible with the security of everyone else in a
united country where they feel a sense of belonging.
The new government and the ethnic problem
By K. Godage
Has the LTTE pulled off another victory? Would their
so-called ?victory? turnout to be a pyrrhic one?
In an article published after the now President
Mahinda Rajapakse concluded agreements with the JVP
and the JHU I referred to the long planned strategy
of the LTTE and quoted Balasingham who had said, ?Our
best allies are the JVP and the JHU?---The perceptive
Balasingham could not have said a truer word for they
wanted to ensure a polarization of forces which they
could not achieve with a Ranil Wickremasinghe
administration. The LTTE?s strategy all along was to
ensure, rather than Ranil, that Mahinda became
President (the TNA was informed of this some months
ago). Ranil to them has been a formidable proposition
for he had not only a structured approach to the
peace process but had also been able to mobilize the
international community.
Even more importantly he had obtained a commitment
from the international community to hold the LTTE to
the matter of ?exploring a federal solution within a
united Sri Lanka,? which the LTTE seems determined to
avoid for their goal remains a separate state. This
was the one and only reason why they prevented the
Tamil people from voting for Ranil. This tactic has
ensured the polarization they sought and would help
them to make the charge that the Sinhalese would not
concede anything to the Tamil people and that their
struggle for a separate state is justified.
This is indeed the challenge that faces the new
President; to prove to the Tamil people and the
international community that though he may have been
elected through a Sinhalese Buddhist vote he is
committed to a fair and just settlement of the ethnic
problem. He has indeed the capacity and the ability
to do so for as his career indicates, he has indeed
achieved whatever he sought to achieve despite the
odds.
It has been reported that a LTTE document circulated
amongst the Tamil Diaspora in Europe states that a
Mahinda victory would be entirely satisfactory to
further their march towards the realization of Eelam.
Their position simply stated is that Mahinda is a
prisoner of the JVP and the JHU and would not be able
to concede anything to the Tamil people; (Statements
made by JVP and JHU leaders have been appended to the
document) and that the LTTE could strengthen its
position on the ground in the peninsula in the near
future and then declare UDI and explain to the
international community that they were compelled to
take this course of action in the light of a hard line
Sinhala racist government coming into Colombo which
left them without any hope.
The diaspora is requested to prepare their lobbyists
to make the point that the LTTE was compelled to take
this course of action in the light of the above
mentioned situation and the continued intransigence
of the governments in the South, who have consistently
refused to concede the rights of the Tamil people
over the past 50 years.
The document, it is said, states that Mahinda is
wholly ignorant of Tamil aspirations and that he nor
his supporters understand the fundamentals of the
problem and their perspective on the issue of Tamil
rights is wholly at variance with reality (there is an
element of truth in this for Minister Premjayant
recently referred to the Tamils as a ?Minority?, they
claim they are a Nation and not a national minority).
The document refers to the fact that unlike Ranil
Wickremesinghe, Mahinda has no experience in dealing
with the international community and describes him as
a novice and that he would not be able to mobilize
international support as Wickremesinghe did and that
this augurs well for them. A reference is made to the
fact that the 'absence' of Lakshman Kadirgamar leaves
the door open for the Diaspora to campaign
effectively.
It appears doubtful as to whether the new government
already has a plan, which they intend to put before
the LTTE and the people. It has been reported that
they had been interested in the Aceh Agreement
brokered by the Fins but that Agreement gives the
Indonesian province of Aceh a measure of autonomy
somewhat similar to the ISGA.
At other times it has been said that they seek a
solution based on the Indian model, which
incidentally involves a sharing of power with the
constituent states. It was indeed the Indian model
that was written into the 13th Amendment; the problem
there was that the Concurrent list in the 13th
Amendment in a sense nullified the devolution. If the
new government wishes to obtain India?s support they
would then need to move forward from the 13th
Amendment; that has to be the road map. In this
regard they would do well to study the Mangala
Moonesinghe report and use that and the 13th
Amendment as a starting point.
Is the JVP and JHU aware that with the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution initiated by India in
the form of Annexure C and enshrined in the
Indo-Lanka Accord, we have commenced an irreversible
process of devolution of power. The so-called
?sanctity? attached to the concept identified as
?Unitary? has, for better or for worse, long been
eroded. Whether we like it or not there are indeed
more federal states including India than unitary
states in the world today.
President Rajapakse would now have to put his
election rhetoric behind him and face reality. Though
they in their Manifesto stated that they would
re-negotiate the CFA and the P-TOMS they must now face
reality and accept that these Agreements cannot be
re-negotiated. Yes the CFA was no ?agreement? it was
an imposition but what makes the parties to the
Manifesto think that they can accomplish the
following; ?the said Agreement (the CFA) shall be
revived and revised fully and the said agreement
shall be redone removing and eliminating all the
clauses that are prejudicial and harmful to national
security??.? What would be the strategy of the
government for doing this? Is it the belief of the
JVP and the JHU that our Armed services could get the
LTTE to yield? That certainly is a laugh. The LTTE
would never agree, what then would or could the new
government do? Go to war? The immense power of the
LTTE over the Tamil people was amply demonstrated when
they intimidated them and they refrained from
participating in the Presidential election; they are
not to be underestimated. The CFA can certainly be
improved upon but then who would bell the cat?
The new government has also created another problem
for themselves by wanting the Norwegians out. I
cannot think of any country that would want to take
on this thankless task, certainly it would not be
India which has proscribed the LTTE and would not
hence be able to have any dealings with them. Yes the
Norwegians have not been honest brokers but where can
you find a replacement for them? As stated earlier,
India cannot and will not get involved in any
exercise that would be frowned upon by the political
parties in Tamil Nadu, we have to live with that
fact. As for the UN, the matter of a meaningful
involvement would have to be endorsed by the Security
Council on the basis that there is a threat to
international peace and security, short of that the SG
could nominate, as he has done, a representative to
make an assessment of the situation.
The ideal situation would be if the SG is able to
obtain the sanction of the SC to appoint a person of
the caliber of Richard Holbrook (to do what he did in
Bosnia with the support of the US) or Richard
Armitage also with the support of the US government to
intercede and undertake a ?John Mitchell? type
operation but it is absolutely unlikely that any
government of Mr. Rajapakse would have the capacity
to work with the international community to pull off a
thing like that.
The problem here is that those who forged the
Manifesto did not have the benefit of being briefed
on the peace process by any knowledgeable person. In
keeping with his stated intention to make the process
inclusive, President Rajapakse and his team should
invite Prof. GL Peiris and Milinda Moragoda who were
associated in talks with the LTTE and Jayantha
Dhanapala to brief them. It is in the country?s
interest that the new government be fully briefed on
the situation. They would also need to be briefed by
the Service Chiefs, the DFI and the DII on the
internal and external dimensions of the issue. They
cannot come to decisions without all the facts and on
the basis of prejudice --- too much is at stake and
they cannot be allowed to make stupid mistakes that
would result in others paying with their lives.
If the new government takes a hard line and tries to
implement their election rhetoric they would not only
be playing right into the hands of the LTTE but would
lead this country into a huge disaster.
A few other matters need to be referred to; Clause 2
of the Agreement between the JVP and President
Rajapakse stated that they would hold negotiations
?not only with the LTTE but also with all other
relevant parties??..? . In principle this is certainly
correct but the LTTE will never sit at the same table
with the others. We cannot also ignore the fact that
it is they who control territory and is the principal
enemy not the others. The only way to involve ?all
other relevant parties ? is to have separate parallel
discussions with them but the LTTE may not come to
the negotiating table if the government also has
parallel negotiations with the other groups. What then
can the government of President Rajapakse then do?
A person sorely missed today is Lakshman Kadirgamar.
Had he been alive he would have explained to them
that their positions are unrealistic. The government
must be briefed on the importance of the
international community in this conflict and the role
that it has played. The Marxist JVP must be briefed
on the international situation today by the able
Foreign Secretary G.S. Pallihakkara and his team.
They must in particular understand why it is
absolutely necessary for this country to have the
closest of relations with the US and Europe and the
total dependence of the garment industry on the US and
the EU and that hundreds of thousands of jobs are at
stake if we cross them. In this regard the new
government should understand that China is our
principal competitor when it comes to the export of
garments. Whilst we should cultivate the closest of
relations with the countries of Asia we should not
forget that the markets for our products are in the
west, neither should we forget that investment and
technology comes essentially from the west as do our
tourists.
In conclusion I wish to remind the new government
that in the period after the ceasefire ?the period of
relative peace resulted in the break-up of the LTTE,
and the LTTE would no doubt be having problems with
keeping their battle-trained cadres in tact; nothing
would help the LTTE to mobilize, motivate and
reinvigorate their cadres than a hard line position
by Sinhala hard-liners in the south.
We are indeed giving the LTTE the excuse they are
waiting nay yearning for. In any event the
international community is tired of what they
perceive to be Sinhala intransigence and would rather
help the LTTE to achieve Eelam unless we move quickly
to address the grievances of the Tamil people and
ensure that they too live as equal citizens with
dignity and in security and be able to decide on their
own destiny to the furthest possible extent
compatible with the security of everyone else in a
united country where they feel a sense of belonging.